An unexpected connection on LinkedIn. A proposal of employment from a recruiter, probably a female agent, based in China. The chance to make perhaps £20,000 part-time preparing a handful of geopolitical reports for a firm from China peppered with “non-public” or privileged insights. Compensation in digital currency or physical money favored.
It might appear obvious, on this telling, that something about this approach would be suspicious. Nevertheless, Beijing's powerful Ministry of State Security continues to view it worthwhile to deploy headhunters to attempt this – prompting MI5 to warn repeatedly about their activity on the internet.
Large-Scale Approaches on Social Media
Last year, the head of MI5 the agency's director said operatives from China were contacting Britons on LinkedIn on an unprecedented level, at a rate of ten thousand over the preceding 30-month period, seeking governmental, industrial, military and technological classified information. But a fresh initiative targeting elected officials and Westminster has prompted the spy agency to act again.
An espionage alert was issued on this week via the offices of Lindsay Hoyle and his Lords counterpart: a single slide after the persistent attempts of Shirly Shen and Amanda Qiu to reach out to MPs, lords, their staffers, economists, thinktanks – anyone who might provide information.
Security Approach and Legislative Changes
In the typical manner of British intelligence, there was no publication of the security advice from MI5 or the interior ministry. But the agency was aware its briefing note would become public once it was sent electronically out to Westminster. Republishing it in the press assists the wider public better identify communications with a deceptive purpose.
The alert has the impact of flushing out more information from in and around parliament, though that is not MI5’s primary purpose. The service aims for people in public life to understand that just because exchanges on professional networks are not as toxic as on X or Facebook, it does not mean they are without risk.
Nor is internal security service believed to have been reacting to any specific incident in parliament, though the recent actions does come after the awkward collapse of the legal case of a former parliamentary aide Christopher Cash and his friend Christopher Berry on a legal detail in recent months.
Both individuals had been accused of working for the foreign power – a charge they denied – but failure to successfully conclude a trial under the now repealed Official Secrets Act resulted in warnings that British democracy had been left unprotected.
Revised Legislation and China's Long-Term Goals
Legislation has now been changed, and the security briefing includes a note of its successor: “Those engaging in spying operations risk significant criminal penalties under the new security law.” It is a crime if somebody participates in conduct that could potentially “materially assist a foreign intelligence service”.
An obvious question, though, is what Beijing has to achieve. An elected representative who is not a government minister will have restricted access of sensitive information, and an contact of theirs less so. But Beijing is also interested in the legislative body: for a time, in recent years, the Britain's China policy on issues such as the telecom firm or the Uyghur repression or genocide was being influenced by parliamentarians.
Cultural Differences and Ongoing Cyber Threats
To a degree there are cultural differences as well. Authoritarian governments like China’s export information gathering methods and the size of its intelligence apparatus is enormous, engaging 300,000 individuals. Chris Inglis, a American cybersecurity head under the US administration, said it was sometimes estimated that “the Chinese have more English speakers involved in this than Western agencies have personnel with language skills”.
The Chinese government is willing to develop people over the extended period and at times even the intelligence services have struggled to differentiate genuine connections and spying. “Beijing has a low threshold for what information is deemed to be of value,” the minister responsible a government official informed parliamentarians on this week, but a rapid shift in the political cycle may mean an individual rapidly marginal turning important.
An alternative perspective to consider the relentless activities at covert intelligence collection is in the wider context of the geopolitical contest between China and the west at a threshold under the point of direct conflict. China has increased its hacking efforts, with the Salt Typhoon penetration of communications systems in 80 countries, and the Volt Typhoon compromise of countless internet devices.
Chinese authorities is engaged in persistent attempts to identify covert sources on British democracy online because it wants to be provocative, to demonstrate power and because it can.
